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Abstract 
Automated negotiation process seems to be a powerful mechanism to resolve disputes arising 
from Internet-based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online blind-bidding process in 
which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers 
are within a prescribed range.\ Following the arguments of the dispute resolution 
professionals, the main advantage of this procedure is to promote ''natural'' agreements by 
restoring the parties' right to negotiate on their own, without the presence of a third party in 
the shadow of negotiations. Our purpose is to investigate this issue by modelling the 
automated negotiation process as a two-person bargaining game under incomplete 
information. A first result states that, given incomplete information, not all mutually 
beneficial agreements can be attained via the procedure. Furthermore, the settlement rule has 
a drastic effect on the players' strategies, which induce that the automated negotiation process 
does not significantly increase the likelihood of a settlement. The ability of the procedure to 
generate efficiency is only due to the costs imposed on parties if a disagreement occurs, that is 
the combination of players' risk aversion and uncertainty.  
 
Keywords: Online Dispute Resolution, Arbitration, Double Auction, Bargaining, Incomplete 
Information. 
  
JEL Classification: K41, C78, D80. 
 
 
''A global alternative dispute resolution system is necessary to encourage cross-border 
electronic commerce''. 
 
Carly Fiorina, CEO, Hewlett-Packard - Meeting of the Global Business Dialogue on e-
Commerce, September 26, 2000, Florida. 
 
 
 
  
Résolution des conflits en ligne et négociation 
  
Résumé: La procédure de négociation automatisée semble être une solution adéquate aux 
litiges issus du commerce électronique. Cette procédure consiste en un programme 
informatique de résolution des conflits, accessible en ligne, qui analyse les propositions 
d'accord émises par les parties et résout le conflit si ces offres appartiennent à un intervalle 
prédéterminé. Selon la profession juridique, le principal avantage de ce mécanisme réside 
dans sa capacité à rétablir le droit inhérent des individus à négocier par eux-mêmes, facilitant 
ainsi l'obtention d'un accord librement consenti, sans l'intervention d'une tierce partie. 
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L'objectif majeur de ce papier est d'analyser l'efficience de cette procédure via sa capacité à 
promouvoir l'obtention d'un accord. Le cadre théorique utilisé est un modèle de double-
enchère avec information incomplète. Tout d'abord, cette caractéristique informationnelle 
génère nécessairement un résultat inefficient. De plus, la règle de négociation utilisée a un 
impact très important sur le comportement de négociation des parties, ce qui implique qu'elle 
introduit un biais important dans l'issue du conflit et n'accroît pas significativement la 
probabilité d'obtention d'un accord. Sa capacité à générer un résultat efficient provient 
uniquement des coûts imposés aux parties en cas de désaccord, liés à leur aversion au risque 
et à la présence d'incertitude. 
 
Mots-clé: Résolution des conflits en ligne, Arbitrage, Double enchère, Négociation, 
Information incomplète. 
1 Introduction
The emergence of the Internet as a commercial phenomenon has resulted in an explosion of
interest in online dispute resolution. Online dispute resolution consists of a variety of meth-
ods such as arbitration and automated negotiation that utilizes the Internet as a means
to more eﬃciently engage parties in non-litigious dispute resolution1. More speciﬁcally,
online dispute resolution resolves disputes by harnessing computer-networking technology
to bring parties together in a dialogue that is usually hosted by a third party service
provider. Typically, the resolution process begins when a claimant registers with an on-
line dispute resolution service provider2, such as ”Allsettle.com” or ”Settlementnow.com”.
The provider then uses the information provided by the claimant to contact the defen-
dant party and invite them to participate in online dispute resolution. If the other party
accepts the invitation, they will then ﬁle a response to the claimant’s complaint3. From
this point, the various providers utilize diﬀerent methodologies. Some have developed
proprietary software that allows parties to engage in automated negotiation of monetary
sums without the participation of a neutral arbitrator. To ﬁx ideas, the software accepts
sealed oﬀers from the parties without the participation of an arbitrator in the shadow of
negotiations. Once the parties’ oﬀers are within a speciﬁed range (in a sense to be deﬁned
later) the case settles.
Such online dispute resolution mechanisms have strong policy implications in bridging
the gap between the Internet and existing laws, and has not received any attention in eco-
nomics. With the rapid growth of e-commerce and cross-border transactions, consumers
and companies found it increasingly diﬃcult to resolve complaints generated from online
transactions. The widespread transboundary transactions are a new phenomenon, and
businesses are only starting to wrestle with the challenges presented by them. For instance,
suppose that you purchase a product from an auction site. First, it is harder to know if the
seller you are working with on the other side of the planet can be trusted. More signiﬁcant,
it is unclear what happens if something goes wrong with the sale (e.g. misrepresentation
or non-delivery of the product). What form of jurisdiction is proper for a consumer or
business seeking remedy with respect to a problematic Internet-based transaction? How
is it possible to haul individuals into court when they may live halfway around the globe?
Consumers who participate in this type of commerce expose themselves to a heightened
level of risk due to the anonymity and location of the individual making a sale or purchase
(Deﬀains and Fenoglio 2001). Online dispute resolution is then a powerful settlement tool
1For a survey of these procedures, see the Center of Law, Commerce and Technology - University of
Washington School of Law - http://law.washington.edu/lct/.
2The provider is simply the website delivering the online dispute resolution process.
3Many of the online market sites (e.g. eBay, Amazon) have developed reputation management systems
that allow the trading parties to submit a rating of the counter party’s performance in a speciﬁc transaction,
which will be made available to all visitors of the site (Keser 2002). In this context, the defendant party
has a strong incentive to accept the provider’s invitation.
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in which the legal location and anonimity of the parties do not matter, since the resolu-
tion is crafted based on the preferences of the parties and does not require the physical
presence of them. This is the primary reason for which many organizations have called
for a variety of business-to-consumer companies to integrate online dispute resolution into
their practices. The Global Business Dialogue on e-Commerce (which includes AOL Time
Warner, Hewlett-Packard, and DaimlerChrysler), the Electronic Commerce and Consumer
Protection Group (including Dell, Microsoft, and Visa), and the International Chamber
of Commerce have all issued recommandations that e-commerce companies make online
dispute resolution available to their customers to resolve any disputes that arise. Online
dispute resolution is applicable in a wide variety of areas, however, the ﬁrst e-commerce
environment to make use of automated negotiation was auction sites. As explained above,
these sites are particularly vulnerable to conﬂict because it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd out who is on
the other side of the transaction4. In March 2000, the online dispute resolution provider
”Squaretrade.com” has been integrated into the online auction eBay in order to reassure
buyers and sellers. However, because many cases come down to a monetary amount, the
insurance industry is by far the largest user of automated negotiation mechanism. Indeed,
the largest online dispute resolution mechanisms that have emerged so far, such as ”Allset-
tle.com” and ”Cybersettle.com”, have focused primarly on this market. Once an accident
occurs the insurance companies deal ﬁrst with the involved parties and then with each
other5. The negotiations between insurance companies to resolve diﬀerences over payment
obligations is a complex and costly process, which can be largely helped by online dispute
resolution.
Comparing to traditional arbitration, many dispute resolution professionals argue that
the main advantage of automated negotiation is to restore and promote the parties’ right to
negotiate on their own, without the presence of a third party in the shadow of negotiations.
Following the arguments by Crawford (1979), Farber and Katz (1979), and Farber (1981),
arbitration will lead the parties’ oﬀers to converge to the arbitrator’s settlement, as one
party can always improve on any oﬀer by oﬀering the arbitrator’s preferred settlement.
Of course, given positive arbitration costs, arbitration should actually not be used at
all. This apparent success of arbitration indicates only that bargainers, while appearing
to negotiate their own settlements, have correctly perceived the arbitrator’s wishes and
yielded to conform to them. In this case, the parties are simply agreeing on what the
arbitrator would award anyway, so arbitration is actually the determining factor, not
negotiation:
”... Bargaining is any process through which the players on their own try to reach an
4For example, the number of online auction complaints received by the United States Federal Trade
Commission shot up from 107 in 1997 to 10.700 in 1999.
5The two main divisions of consumer-focused insurance companies are the property-casualty insurers,
which deal with policies like auto or home assurance, and life-health insurers, which deal with medical and
life insurance.
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agreement... If the players get a third party to help them determine the agreement, then
this means that agreement is not reached via bargaining.”6
The use of an automated negotiation mechanism as a dispute resolution procedure seems
to be able to promote a more ”natural” convergence by transferring the decision-making
authority to the parties (instead of the arbitrator), who keep then the control of the
bargaining process and its outcome.
Our principal aim is to investigate this issue by modelling the automated negotiation
procedure as a two-person bargaining under incomplete information. Like Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983), we frame the bargaining situation as a double auction game and focus
on the resulting set of equilibrium outcomes. Let us brieﬂy elaborate. Acting indepen-
dently and without prior communication, seller and buyer submit price oﬀers ps and pb
respectively. If these oﬀers are compatible, a transaction is concluded at a price that de-
pends on the oﬀers; if they are not, then no transaction takes place. However, the design
of the automated negociation mechanism diﬀers from the traditional double auction ap-
proach on the compatibility criterium. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) consider that the
oﬀers are compatible if and only if the price oﬀered by the buyer is higher than the price
proposed by the seller (i.e. pb ≥ ps), while we assume, following the automated negotiation
process explained above, that the oﬀers are compatible if they are just within a speciﬁed
range (i.e. pb (1 + δ) ≥ ps even if pb < ps, where δ ∈ [0, 1) will be called the compatibility
factor7). Therefore, it seems that the automated negotiation procedure would be able
to help the disputants to reach an agreement, where the degree to which it can do so is
captured by the magnitude of the parameter δ. A ﬁrst result is that, given incomplete
information, not all mutually beneﬁcial agreements can be attained via the procedure.
Even when the buyer values the good more highly than the seller, a successful sale may
be impossible. Additionaly, we present useful comparative statics results indicating the
eﬀect on the probability that a settlement occurs of changes in the parameter δ and the
degree of players’ risk aversion. It appears that the parameter δ is an important factor
determining the players’ oﬀer strategies. As δ increases, the disputants are motivated to
make more aggressive oﬀers which induce that the automated negotiation procedure does
not signiﬁcantly increase the range of possible settlements. Surprisingly, this result sug-
gests that automated negotiation design is not a good way for increasing the likelihood of
a settlement, in the sense that it creates a prisonner’s dilemma situation: each party has a
strong individual incentive to exploit strategically the compatibility factor and adopt ag-
gressive positions, which leads to a collective ineﬃcient result. The ability of the procedure
to generate eﬃciency is only due to the costs imposed on parties if a disagreement occurs,
that is the combination of players’ risk aversion and uncertainty regarding the opponent’s
reservation price.
6Abhinay Muthoo (1999), p.2.
7Following the existing automated negotiation procedures, we consider that the compatibility factor is
common knowledge.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down our model,
and derives our main results concerning the equilibrium strategies and how they depend
on the compatibility factor. The equilibrium implications of the players’ risk aversion is
also discussed in this section. Section 3 concludes by describing a possible extension of the
model.
2 The Model
2.1 Strategic Environment
Framework. We consider two players, a buyer and a seller of an indivisible good, N =
{b, s}. A settlement is concluded if and only if the good is transferred at an acceptable
price. Let vs denote the seller’s reservation price (i.e. the smallest monetary sum he will
accept in exchange for the good). Similarly, let vb denote the buyer’s reservation price (i.e.
the greatest sum he is willing to pay for the good)8. The valuations of the good of the
buyer and the seller are their private information. Incomplete information of the bargainers
is modeled by the following assumption: each party knows his own reservation price, but
his uncertain about his adversary’s, assessing a subjective probability distribution over the
range of possible values that his opponent might hold. Speciﬁcally, each party regards the
opponent’s reservation value as a random variable drawn from an independent uniform
distribution, and these distribution functions are common knowledge. Each bargainer i
is likely to have a reservation value vi between 0 and 1, and every value of vi in that
interval has the same chance of occurring. Therefore, the type spaces are respectively
Tb = {0 ≤ vb ≤ 1} and Ts = {0 ≤ vs ≤ 1}. The incomplete information approach provides
a useful framework to take into account some key features of actual negotiations: the fact
that each bargainer is uncertain about its adversary’s payoﬀ and the possible occurence
of ”unreasonable” bargaining outcomes, such as breakdowns in negotiations, even when
mutually beneﬁcial agreements are possible. In this framework, bargaining behavior de-
pends on a player’s reservation price, his assessment of the opponent’s reservation price,
the knowledge of the opponent’s assessment, and the compatibility factor between the
players’ oﬀers assumed by the automated negotiation process. This procedure provides
the following bargaining structure.
Bargaining rule. Buyer and seller submit simultaneous oﬀers, pb and ps respectively,
deﬁning the action spaces Ab = {pb ≥ 0} and As = {ps ≥ 0}. The computer software
analyzes the oﬀers to see if a settlement has been reached. If the oﬀers converge or
crisscross (i.e. pb ≥ ps), then the case is settled and the good is sold at price p = ps. If
they are not, but diﬀer by less than δ (i.e. pb (1 + δ) ≥ ps > pb), then the case is also settled
8Even though we keep the terminology used by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), it may be helpful
to think of the seller as a plaintiﬀ and the buyer as a defendant who bargain over the price at which the
plaintiﬀ will sell his claim to the lawsuit.
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and the good is sold at price p = (pb + ps) /2, where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the compatibility factor
associated to the automated negotiation procedure. In this latter case, the rule determines
the settlement price by splitting the diﬀerence between the players’ oﬀers. If the oﬀers
diﬀer by more than δ, then the agreement is not reached. In this case, there is no sale and
no money trades hands since each player’s payoﬀ from disagreement is zero. In order to
illustrate conveniently the bargaining rule of the automated negotiation mechanism, let
us take an example. We suppose that δ = 30% and consider the three cases mentioned
above:
Case Buyer’s oﬀer (pb) Seller’s demand (ps) Result Detail
1 $35,000 $30,000 Settlement for $30,000 pb > ps
→ p = ps
2 $30,000 $38,000 Settlement for $34,000 pb (1 + δ) ≥ ps > pb
→ p = (pb + ps) /2
3 $20,000 $60,000 No Settlement pb (1 + δ) < ps
→ No agreement
A main focus of attention concerns the role and impact that δ may have on the bargaining
behavior and the likelihood of a settlement, given that the actual automated negotiation
procedures consider diﬀerent values of δ. For example, ”123Settle.com” consider that the
case is settled if the oﬀers are within a range of δ = 20%, while ”clickNsettle.com” and
”Settlementnow.com” provide a compatibility factor of δ = 30%. In order to conduct our
analysis in a simpliﬁed manner and isolate this potential role of the compatibility factor,
we deliberately omit from our model various other elements of automated negotiation
procedures that would also have some role and impact on the issue under study. Especially,
some restrictive assumptions are made in order to develop understanding and intuition
about the role of the forces under study in a sharper manner.
Assumptions. First, we substitute a single stage bargaining procedure for the multi-
stage representation usually considered in the automated negotiation procedures, in which
the buyer and the seller are involved in a ﬁnite sequence of the one-shot game described
above. For example, ”Allsettle.com” and ”Settlesmart.com” provide three periods to the
parties for reaching an agreement. Through abstracting from the dynamics of the negotia-
tion process, the single stage bargaining procedure emphasizes the basic strategy trade-oﬀ
faced by each player. By making a more aggressive oﬀer, a player earns a greater proﬁt
in the event of an agreement but, at the same time, increases the risk of a disagreement,
depending on the value of the compatibility factor.
Second, we assume, without lost of generality, that there is no direct cost for the parties
from using the automated negotiation service - this is a simplifying modelling assumption.
Currently the automated negotiation providers use a wide range of fee structures, although
the fees are less expensive than traditional litigation. There is no one fee structure that
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appears to be dominant, however, it is common for companies to employ a submission fee
(incurred by the party requesting the resolution) and a settlement fee (incurred by both
parties if and only if a successful settlement is reached).
Finally, we implicitly assume throughout this paper that the agreement struck via the
automated negotiation process is binding for the parties. Indeed, the actual users of such
services have to agree in writing to be legally bound by all settlements arising from the
negotiation. Therefore, settlements are binding on both parties and preclude them from
seeking redress in court for the same claim. In addition, parties are barred from bringing
any other suit arising from the same facts from which the claim arose.
Framing the single stage bargain as a noncooperative game, we will characterize the
resulting Bayesian Nash equilibria. In the event of an agreement, each player earns a proﬁt
measured by the diﬀerence between the agreed price and his reservation price (p− vs for
the seller and vb− p for the buyer); in the event of no agreement, each earns a zero proﬁt.
The payoﬀs to both the buyer and the seller are then:
ub (ps, pb; vs, vb) =



vb − ps if pb ≥ ps
vb − pb+ps2 if pb (1 + δ) ≥ ps > pb
0 if pb (1 + δ) < ps
(1)
us (ps, pb; vs, vb) =



ps − vs if pb ≥ ps
pb+ps
2 − vs if pb (1 + δ) ≥ ps > pb
0 if pb (1 + δ) < ps
(2)
Additionally, we assume that each bargainer makes oﬀers to maximize his expected proﬁt
and we restrict attention to striclty monotonic and diﬀerentiable strategies for the two
players. In this static bayesian game, a strategy for the buyer is a function pb (vb) and a
strategy for the seller is a function ps (vs), indicating that the players’ price oﬀers depend
on their respective reservation prices.
Consider now the buyer’s best reply. This is deﬁned by the following maximization prob-
lem:
max
pb
Evs {ub (ps, pb; vs, vb) /vb, ps (vs)} (3)
The seller’s best reply is deﬁned by the following maximization problem:
max
ps
Evb {us (ps, pb; vs, vb) /vs, pb (vb)} (4)
Then player i employs a best response strategy if for each vi his oﬀer is a best re-
sponse against his opponent’s strategy. A pair of best response oﬀer strategies constitute
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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2.2 Equilibrium strategies and Settlement
Benchmark case. As a benchmark, we consider ﬁrst the case where there is no compati-
bility factor (i.e. δ = 0). This example is useful to derive some comparative statics results
indicating the eﬀect on bargaining behavior of changes in the value of δ. In that case the
payoﬀs to both the buyer and the seller become:
ub (ps, pb; vs, vb) =



vb − ps if pb ≥ ps
0 if pb < ps
(5)
us (ps, pb; vs, vb) =



ps − vs if pb ≥ ps
0 if pb < ps
(6)
A fundamental property of equilibrium oﬀer strategies for which agreements occur is that
they are increasing in the individual reservation prices. The higher the value placed on the
good by the seller (resp. buyer), the higher the price he demands (resp. oﬀers).
Lemma 1. Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, considering the case in
which there is no compatibility factor, the equilibrium oﬀer strategies are
pb (vb) = vb and ps (vs) =
1
2
vs +
1
2
Proof. See appendix 4.1.
In other words the buyer’s oﬀer coincides with his reservation price while the seller’s asking
price is biased upward with respect to his valuation. The intuition behind this result is the
following. When a settlement is reached, the good is sold at price p = ps, therefore the rule
is equivalent to granting the seller the right to make a ﬁrst and ﬁnal oﬀer that the buyer
can accept or reject. In this instance, the sale price is determined solely by the seller’s
oﬀer, while the buyer’s oﬀer serves only to determine whether there is an agreement or
not. The buyer’s optimal strategy is then to make a truthful oﬀer (i.e. pb = vb for all vb).
Furthermore, given that an agreement is reached if and only if pb ≥ ps, manipulating the
equilibrium oﬀer strategies in Lemma 1 shows that an agreement occurs in the equilibrium
if and only if:
vb ≥
1
2
vs +
1
2
(7)
Comparing with the ex-post eﬃcient trading pattern, we conclude that there is too little
trading in equilibrium, as stated in Proposition 1. In terms of Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983)’s analysis we argue that there exists an ineﬃciency in the bilateral trading model.
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Proposition 1. Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, considering the
case in which there is no compatibility factor, the settlement zone is under-eﬃcient.
This implies that, under this assumption, there is no Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
automated negotiation game in which trade occurs if and only if it is eﬃcient (i.e. if and
only if vb ≥ vs). Given incomplete information, not all mutually beneﬁcial agreements can
be attained via bargaining and Coase’s Theorem fails to apply (Coase 1937). Even when
the buyer values the good more highly than the seller, a successful settlement may be
impossible. The ineﬃciency generated by the bilateral trading mechanism is represented
by the hatched area on Figure 1:
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Figure 1 - Settlement zone when δ = 0
Compatibility factor. The next analysis characterizes the equilibrium strategies for a
positive compatibility factor (i.e. δ > 0). It would appear at ﬁrst blush that an increase in
the value of δ improves the eﬃciency of the automated negotiation procedure by increasing
the settlement zone. In the case where δ = 0, an agreement occurs only when there is
some ”bargaining space” between the two oﬀers (i.e. when pb− ps ≥ 0), while a positive δ
provides the parties a possibility to reach an agreement even when this ”bargaining space”
does not exist (i.e. when pb−ps < 0, provided that pb (1 + δ)−ps ≥ 0). Therefore, should
not a positive compatibility factor signiﬁes an increase in the probability that a settlement
occurs? The answer is no. The ﬂaw in this line of reasoning is that it implicitly assumes
that the bargaining strategies are unaﬀected by the changes in compatibility factor. This
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is not the case, however, since it is easy to show that changes in the compatibility factor
have a drastic eﬀect on the equilibrium behavior of the parties: other things equal, when δ
increases, both the buyer and the seller become more aggressive, the buyer moving closer
to his reservation value, the seller asking an higher price.
Lemma 2. Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, considering the case in
which there is a positive compatibility factor, the equilibrium oﬀer strategies are
pb (vb) = b (δ) vband ps (vs) = s (δ) vs + c (δ)
where b (δ) = 2 (1 + δ) /
¡
δ2 + 4δ + 2
¢
, s (δ) = 2 (1 + δ) / (2 + δ)2 and
c (δ) = 4 (1 + δ)3 / (2 + δ)2
¡
δ2 + 4δ + 2
¢
.
Proof. See appendix 4.2.
Remark that b (0) = 1 and s (0) = c (0) = 1/2, in accordance with the results stated in
Lemma 1. Following these expressions, a straightforward comparative statics analysis can
conﬁrm that, as δ increases, the slope of each oﬀer strategy decreases causing the players’
bargaining positions to become more aggressive:
b
0
(δ) = −2
¡
δ2 + 2δ + 2
¢
¡
δ2 + 4δ + 2
¢2 < 0 and s0 (δ) = −2δ(2 + δ)3 < 0, since δ > 0
The players’ oﬀer strategies are sensitive to changes in the compatibility factor in a natural
way: with an increasing compatibility factor, the marginal increment in proﬁt associated
with a slighty more agressive oﬀer (i.e. a higher seller oﬀer or a lower buyer oﬀer) becomes
weighted more heavily than the possible loss, if as a result of the change, an agreement is
precluded. This fact leads the players to move away from their true valuations. Therefore,
what is the eﬀect of this bargaining behavior on the probability that an agreement occurs
(i.e. on the size of the settlement zone) in the automated negotiation process? In fact,
the compatibility factor has two opposite implications:
First, by providing the parties an additional possibility to reach an agreement (i.e. when
pb (1 + δ) ≥ ps > pb), the compatibility factor increases the settlement zone for given
bargaining strategies. Manipulating the equilibrium oﬀer strategies in Lemma 2 shows
that such an ”assisted settlement” occurs in equilibrium if and only if:·δ2 + 4δ + 2
(2 + δ)2
¸
vs +
2(1 + δ)2
(2 + δ)2
> vb ≥
· δ2 + 4δ + 2
(1 + δ) (2 + δ)2
¸
vs +
2 (1 + δ)
(2 + δ)2
(8)
A straightforward comparative statics analysis can conﬁrm that δ has a positive (resp.
negative) impact on the left-hand side (resp. right-hand side) of (8), which increases the
assisted settlement zone.
Furthermore, as explained above, the compatibility factor leads the players to become
more aggressive and, therefore, discourages them to converge on their own. Given that
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such a ”free settlement” is reached if and only if pb ≥ ps, manipulating the equilibrium
oﬀer strategies in Lemma 2 shows that such an agreement occurs in equilibrium if and
only if:
vb ≥
·δ2 + 4δ + 2
(2 + δ)2
¸
vs +
2(1 + δ)2
(2 + δ)2
(9)
It is rather simple to conﬁrm that δ has a positive impact on the right-hand side of (9),
which decreases the free settlement zone.
The global eﬀect of the compatibility factor on the probability that a settlement occurs
is not signiﬁcant, except for extreme values of δ which do not exist in the real automated
negotiation procedures:
Assisted settlement zone: Free settlement zone: Settlement zone:
[pb (1 + δ) ≥ ps > pb] [pb ≥ ps] [pb (1 + δ) ≥ ps]
Eﬀect of an increase
in δ : [∆δ > 0] + − ' 0
In order to illustrate the very low sensitivity of the settlement zone to changes in the
compatibility factor, we consider only two extreme values of δ, that is δ = {0, 0.5}. The
hatched area characterizes the eﬃciency gain due to the increase in the compatibility
factor.
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Figure 2 - Settlement zones when δ = {0, 0.5}
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where the solid (resp. dash) straightline corresponds to the equation vb =
h
δ2+4δ+2
(1+δ)(2+δ)2
i
vs+
2(1+δ)
(2+δ)2 with δ = 0 (resp. δ = 0.5).
The result illustrated in this ﬁgure is stated precisely in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, the compatibility
factor does not improve signiﬁcantly the eﬃciency of the settlement zone.
This result indicates that, as the compatibility factor increases, the gain in eﬃciency due
to the increase in the assisted settlement zone is approximatively oﬀset by the eﬃciency
loss due to the decrease in the free settlement zone, causing the settlement zone to be
slighlty aﬀected by changes in δ. The intuition underlying this analysis is the following:
the compatibility factor decreases the pressure on the parties to take realistic bargaining
positions and to move closer their true values because each party seems to believe that he
is ”protected” of a disagreement by the existence of δ. However, this protection induces
also a perverse eﬀect by discouraging the parties to converge on their own: although each
player increases the probability that an agreement occurs by compromising his oﬀer, this
gain in probability is more than oﬀset by the loss in potential payoﬀ it suﬀers when δ
increases. The parties have more reluctance to concede during negotiations because the
threat that a disagreement occurs is less credible for high values of δ. Therefore, at the
same time as the assisted settlement zone increases, the compatibility factor has a drastic
and negative eﬀect on the probability that a free settlement occurs. These elements make
the automated negotiation mechanism corresponds with the prisonner’s dilemma: each
party has a strong individual incentive to exploit strategically the compatibility factor and
take agressive bargaining positions which, in turn, leads to a collective ineﬃcient result.
As a result, the well-known criticism about arbitration, mentioned in the introduction, is
still relevant regarding the automated negotiation procedure. The automated negotiation
agreements tend to be of low quality in the sense that they lie outside the range of free
negotiated settlements. The results indicate that the parties have correctly perceived the
strategic implications of the compatibility factor and have incentives to adopt aggressive
bargaining positions. Given that the compatibility factor increases the assisted settlement
zone and decreases the free settlement zone, it appears that the players’ convergence is
only driven by this parameter.
However, additional insight into the nature of the bargaining equilibrium can be gained by
relaxing the assumption that the parties are risk neutral. The dependence of the players’
oﬀer strategies and the settlement zone on risk preferences of the parties is investigated
in the following section.
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2.3 Players Risk Aversion
We consider that the players’ utility functions display constant relative risk aversion,
u (y) = yα
, where α ∈ [0, 1]. As a simple illustration, let the parties be equally risk-averse in the
following sense: in the limit as α approaches 0 (resp. 1), the players become inﬁnitely
risk averse (resp. risk neutral). In order to keep the analysis tractable and isolate the
eﬀect of risk aversion on the players’ strategies, we consider only the case where there is
no compatibility factor (i.e. δ = 0), the results staying relevant for positive values of δ.
Following straightforward modiﬁcations of equations (5) and (6), it is easy to check that
the payoﬀs to both the buyer and the seller are:
ub (ps, pb; vs, vb) =



(vb − ps)α if pb ≥ ps
0 if pb < ps
(10)
us (ps, pb; vs, vb) =



(ps − vs)α if pb ≥ ps
0 if pb < ps
(11)
Let us consider the eﬀect on the bargaining strategies as the players become increasingly
risk averse: as α decreases, the slope of each oﬀer strategy increases. The result is lower
seller oﬀers and higher buyer oﬀers.
Lemma 3. Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, considering the case in
which there is no compatibility factor, the equilibrium oﬀer strategies are
pb (vb) = b (α) vb + d (α) and ps (vs) = s (α) vs + c (α)
where b (α) = 2/ (1 + α), d (α) = 2α (α− 1) / (1 + 3α) (1 + α),
s (α) = 1/ (1 + δ), and c (α) = 2α/ (1 + 3α).
Proof. See appendix 4.3.
Remark that b (1) = 1, d (1) = 0, and s (1) = c (1) = 1/2, in accordance with the results
stated in Lemma 1. Furthermore, a straightforward calculation can conﬁrm that, as
α decreases, the slope of each oﬀer strategy increases causing the players’ bargaining
positions to be less aggressive (and the intercept to fall):
b
0
(α) = −2
(1 + α)2
< 0 and s
0
(δ) = −1
(1 + α)2
< 0, since α ≥ 0
The intuition behind this result is the following. With risk aversion, the marginal incre-
ment in proﬁt associated with a slighty more agressive oﬀer (i.e. a higher seller oﬀer or
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a lower buyer oﬀer) is weighted less heavily than the possible loss. Therefore, the risk
averse parties take more reasonable bargaining positions in order to reduce the disutility
of a bad outcome if a disagreement occurs. In the case of diﬀerent degrees of risk aver-
sion, one could show that, other things equal, an increase in the risk aversion of the seller
(resp. buyer) implies lower (resp. higher) oﬀers by both parties in equilibrium. Indeed,
the opponent’s best response to more truthful oﬀers by the player who has become more
risk averse is to make more aggressive oﬀers himself.
Not surprisingly, the probability that a settlement occurs in the automated negotiation
procedure is sensitive to changes in the level of players risk aversion in the following way:
as the players become more risk averse (i.e. α decreases), the settlement zone increases,
causing the probability that an agreement occurs to be higher. Given that an agreement
is reached if and only if pb ≥ ps, manipulating the equilibrium oﬀer strategies in Lemma
3 shows that an agreement occurs if and only if:
vb ≥
1
2
vs +
2α
1 + 3α (12)
Following a comparative statics analysis, it is rather simple to check that α has a positive
impact on the right-hand side of (12). To illustrate this result, see Figure 3 in which the
two extreme values of α are considered (i.e. α = {0, 1}) and the eﬃciency gain due to the
players’ risk aversion is characterized by the hatched area.
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Figure 3 - Settlement zones when α = {0, 1}
where the solid (resp. dash) straightline corresponds to the equation vb =
1
2vs +
2α
1+3α
with α = 1 (resp. α = 0).
The result illustrated in this ﬁgure is stated in the following Proposition.
13
Proposition 3. Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, considering the
case where there is no compatibility factor, the parties’ risk aversion improves signiﬁcantly
the eﬃciency of the settlement zone.
The intuition underlying this result is the following. The parties’ risk aversion is eﬀective
in promoting settlements to the extent that it imposes costs on the bargainers in the event
they fail to reach an agreement. The ability of the procedure to generate eﬃciency and
induce the parties to reach a settlement is only due to the costs imposed on bargainers if
a disagreement occurs, these costs resulting from the combination of risk aversion by the
parties and their uncertainty regarding the opponent’s valuation.
3 Concluding Remarks
In this study a model of the use of automated negotiation procedure and the outcomes of
negotiated settlements was developed. The central idea is that the automated negotiation
mechanism in combination with the behavioral processes of decision making under uncer-
tainty determine the environment within which the parties negotiate, and consequently,
strongly aﬀects the bargaining behavior and the terms of negotiated agreements. We argue
that with this relatively simple and natural structure we have been able to demonstrate the
following facts: ﬁrst of all, under the automated negotiation mechanism, the disputants
are motivated to posture and make preposterous oﬀers, leading the occurence of a free
settlement to be less likely (and the occurence of an assisted settlement to be more likely).
The upshot is that the more compromising party, while enhancing its chances of reaching
an agreement, does so at the expense of lowering its expected payoﬀ when the parties
choose their equilibrium strategies. This result is consistent with the predictions of the
arbitration models in the sense that the agreements are driven by the dispute resolution
mechanism and lie outside the range of potential negotiated settlements. In fact, the com-
puter software seems to become a neutral third party who drives the players’ strategies.
Second, for the reasons described above, going to the automated negotiation procedure
does not signiﬁcantly increase the range of possible settlements, which suggests that this
dispute resolution mechanism is not a relevant source of eﬃciency. The ability of the
procedure to generate eﬃciency and induce the parties to reach a settlement is only due
to the costs imposed on bargainers if a disagreement occurs. The parties’ uncertainty re-
garding the opponent’s valuation alters fundamentally the oﬀer strategies by encouraging
concessionary behavior by risk-averse bargainers.
These results have important policy implications for the evaluation and design of auto-
mated negotiation systems. Indeed, to the extent that the settlement zone is a convenient
measure of the ability of the automated negotiation procedure to promote settlements, this
suggests that maintaining such a design is not a good way for increasing the likelihood of a
settlement. This conclusion can be of a main importance for several business-to-consumer
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and business-to-business companies (e.g. auction sites, insurance companies) which pro-
vide automated negotiation services to resolve disputes between consumers. However, we
have only just scratched the surface of the various matters that impige on this issue. Much
more work remains to be done in order to develop the automated negotiation procedures.
For example, the automated negotiation sytems are limited since they can be employed
only when there is a single sticking point and the sticking point involves money or some-
thing else that is quantiﬁable. It could be interesting to develop negotiation softwares
intended for use in disputes that are single-issue or multi-issue, two-party or multi-party,
composed of quantitative or qualitative issues.
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4 Appendix
4.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider ﬁrst the buyer’s optimal strategy choice. Recall that we consider a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of game between the buyer and the seller, hence when the buyer chooses
his oﬀer price he takes the strategy of the seller as given.
The buyer’s payoﬀ when we substitute ps (vs) in (5) is then:
ub (ps, pb; vs, vb) =



vb − ps (vs) if pb ≥ ps (vs)
0 if pb < ps (vs)
In other words
ub (ps, pb; vs, vb) =



vb − ps (vs) if vs ≤ p−1s (pb)
0 if vs > p
−1
s (pb)
(13)
Using (13) we can rewrite problem (3) as
max
pb
Z p−1s (pb)
vs=0
[vb − ps (vs)] dvs (14)
The ﬁrst order condition of problem (14) is
[vb − pb]
dp−1s (pb)
dpb
= 0 (15)
since pb = ps
¡
p−1s (pb)
¢
.
Consider now the seller’s optimal strategy choice.
The seller’s payoﬀ obtained by substituting pb (vb) in (6) is then:
us (ps, pb; vs, vb) =



ps − vs if vb ≥ p−1b (ps)
0 if vb < p
−1
b (ps)
(16)
As done above, using (16) we can rewrite problem (4) as
max
ps
Z 1
vb=p
−1
b
(ps)
[ps − vs] dvb = (ps − vs)
£
1− p−1
b
(ps)
¤
(17)
The ﬁrst order condition of problem (17) is
(vs − ps)
dp−1b (ps)
dps
+
£
1− p−1
b
(ps)
¤
= 0 (18)
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To simplify notation we re-write p−1b (.) = qb (.) and p
−1
s (.) = qs (.). The two diﬀerential
equations (15) and (18) deﬁne the optimal strategies for the buyer and the seller. Therefore
the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of this bilateral trade model is characterized by the two
diﬀerential equations:
[qb (pb)− pb] q
0
s (pb) = 0 (19)
[qs (ps)− ps] q
0
b (ps) + [1− qb (ps)] = 0 (20)
From (19) we obtain:
qb (pb) = pb (21)
Substituting (21) into (20) we obtain:
qs (ps) = 2ps − 1 (22)
Using vb = qb (pb) and vs = qs (ps), (21) and (22) we conclude that the buyer’s and seller’s
equilibrium strategies are:
pb (vb) = vb and ps (vs) =
1
2
vs +
1
2
Notice that the players’ equilibrium strategies are linear:
pb (vb) = ab + cbvb with ab = 0 and cb = 1
ps (vs) = as + csvs with as =
1
2
and cs =
1
2
4.2 Proof of Lemma 2
In order to keep the analysis tractable, we now derive a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the automated negotiation mechanism. We are not restricting the players’ strategy
spaces to include only linear strategies. Rather, we allow the players to choose arbitrary
strategies but ask whether there is an equilibrium that is linear (Gibbons 1992).
Therefore, suppose the seller’s strategy is ps (vs) = as+csvs and the buyer’s one is pb (vb) =
ab + cbvb. Then ps is uniformly distributed on [as, as + cs] and pb is uniformly distributed
on [ab, ab + cb].
If there is a positive compatibility factor (i.e. δ > 0), then (3) and (4) become
max
pb
µ
vb −
as + pb
2
¶
pb − as
cs
+
·
vb −
pb (4 + δ)
4
¸ δpb
cs
max
ps
(ps − vs)
ab + cb − ps
cb
+
·
ps (4 + 3δ)
4 (1 + δ) − vs
¸ δps
cb (1 + δ)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for which yield
pb =
2(1 + δ)
δ2 + 4δ + 2
vb (23)
ps =
2 (1 + δ)
(2 + δ)2
vs +
2 (1 + δ)2
(2 + δ)2
(ab + cb) (24)
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Given the linear strategies pb (vb) = ab+cbvb and ps (vs) = as+csvs, by manipulating (23)
and (24), the linear equilibrium strategies are
pb (vb) =
2 (1 + δ)
δ2 + 4δ + 2
vb
ps (vs) =
2 (1 + δ)
(2 + δ)2
vs +
4(1 + δ)3
(2 + δ)2
¡
δ2 + 4δ + 2
¢
4.3 Proof of Lemma 3
If the players are risk averse (i.e. α > 0), then (3) and (4) become
max
pb
µ
vb −
as + pb
2
¶αµpb − as
cs
¶
max
ps
(ps − vs)α
µ
ab + cb − ps
cb
¶
The ﬁrst-order conditions for which yield
pb =
2
1 + αvb +
α− 1
1 + αas (25)
ps =
1
1 + αvs +
α
1 + α (ab + cb) (26)
Given the linear strategies pb (vb) = ab+cbvb and ps (vs) = as+csvs, by manipulating (25)
and (26), the linear equilibrium strategies are
pb (vb) =
2
1 + αvb +
2α (α− 1)
(1 + 3α) (1 + α)
ps (vs) =
1
1 + αvs +
2α
1 + 3α
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